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The Usual Suspects Retain Power: Guatemalan Elections 2007
NISGUA
9/14/2007

by Alexandra Durbin and Sue Kuyper of the Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA)

Guatemala's first-round election results are in, and human rights advocates have little cause for celebration. Presidency and Congress will once again be dominated by representatives of the elite, infamous military officials, and masterminds of organized crime.

Violence and Intimidation

In a country devastated by violence - evidenced by an annual murder rate higher than that of the civil war and a single-digit conviction rate for offenders - it would be unrealistic to expect election day to be an oasis of peace and tranquility. The climate of insecurity affects the exercise of democracy in Guatemala on many levels: from the paralysis of intimidated activists, to the popularity of a hard-line approach to crime, to fear of supporting leaders who threaten the powers-that-be.

On voting day, conflict erupted in 105 municipalities. Incidents included the temporary kidnapping of the mayor in Sacatepequez, ballot burning in Santa Rosa, burning of municipal offices, take-overs of voting stations, lynching threats, robbery of computer equipment, road blocks, fist-fights, and other types of confrontation between party sympathizers.

Behind the scenes of Guatemalan politics lurk shadowy networks of war criminals and organized mafias who repeatedly resort to intimidation and crime to hold onto their power. In addition to targeting grassroots human rights leaders, these clandestine groups terrorize and attack party leaders whose platforms or competing interests pose a threat to their own power.

Since the election season officially opened in May, some 50 party leaders, candidates, and activists have been murdered. Authorities have made no arrests in these cases and have even denied that these killings were politically motivated.

Local strongmen, some with criminal pasts, exploited their economic standing or questionable alliances to use intimidation, payments, or a combination of the two to persuade citizens to vote for a particular mayor or party. The legacy of war and terror continues to shape voter choice. Some people picked the candidate less likely to take violent retribution against detractors. In other cases, participants specifically cast their votes for those they suspected might react with displeasure, even violence, towards those who voted against them. Behind this rationale is citizens' lack of trust in the secrecy of the ballot and their ongoing fear that political henchmen are recording their votes.

The Run-off: "Hope" Versus "Heavy Hand"

Citizens went to the polls on September 9th to vote for President, Vice President, 158 Congressional representatives, and 332 municipal council members. Because no Presidential candidate took in more than 50% of the vote, the top two contenders - Alvaro Colom with 28% and Otto Perez Molina with 24% - will compete in a run-off election on November 4.

Alvaro Colom represents the National Unity of Hope (UNE), a party at the center of various interests including business, social, and suspected mafia groups. His past includes running textile businesses, wor king from within the government on the refugees' return from Mexico, and training as a Maya spiritual guide. The party has attracted many voters by billing itself as a progre ssive option; Colom ran for President with the leftist New Nation Alliance (ANN) in 1999.

However, characterizations of the party have run the gamut from "social-democrat" to "centrist" to "right-wing." Colom himself in 2003 described UNE as center-right. Critics see Colom as hard to pin down, willing to make almost any alliance, and too weak to stand up to the illicit parallel powers that manipulate the State. In fact, the party itself is believed to be infiltrated by clandestine groups. UNE has been hardest hit by the spate of political killings, perhaps less because the party represents a radical option that would overturn the status quo, but rather because its particular interests compete with those of other groups. The vice presidential candidate is linked to the Chamber of Industry.

Otto Perez Molina is the presidential aspirant for the Patriot Party (PP). This former general and 1987 graduate of the School of the Americas served in the hard-hit Ixil region in the 1980s. According to an article by Allan Nairn in "The Nation," he figured on the CIA payroll while head of G-2 military intelligence in the 1990s. Perez Molina has been accused of involvement in human rights abuses, including the killings of Bishop Juan Jose Gerardi and Efrain "Everardo" Bamaca. The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) describes him as the head of the clandestine group "Sindicato" whose counterinsurgent philosophy was to "kill 30% and provide development to 70%." Some analysts even blame Perez Molina for orchestrating recent waves of violence in a bid to win support for his security-focused campaign message.

The PP platform emphasizes a tough stance on crime and poverty. This mano dura - "hard hand" or heavy-fisted - approach appeals to many Guatemalans disgusted by high levels of insecurity. PP reportedly holds strong links to mafia capital and enjoys financial backing from the elite Gutierrez-Bosch family that owns the fried-chicken chain Pollo Campero. Its Vice Presidential candidate hails from the Castillo Brothers Corporation which controls the Banco Industrial and th e beer, soda, and bottled water industry. Curiously, of the 14 presidential candidates, George W. Bush met only with Perez Molina during his March 2007 visit to Guatemala.

Human rights organizations agonize that a win by Perez Molina would further entrench impunity in the fabric of society while serving as a go-ahead for so-called "social cleansing" and other authoritarian measures of social control. He has promised to reactivate repressive structures such as the civil patrols.

Rigoberta Menchu 

Heralded in international circles, Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchu Tum made history as the first indigenous person and the first woman to run for President inGuatemala. The National Indigenous and Campesino Coordination (CONIC) endorsed Menchu's candidacy, calling it "congruent with our thinking, our history and our.Maya identity." That she garnered only 3% of the vote came as a surprise to many, especially since surveys in 2006 indicated that the Guatemalan public held a favorable opinion of her overall.

Menchu's low national showing is due partly to racist and sexist attitudes that deprived her of support in various circles. Also at fault were underdeveloped party organizing, an insufficient base, and a rushed and poorly funded campaign that was launched barely three months before the elections. Her limited publicity and campaign promises around "inclusivity" could not compete with the flashy messages and concrete hand-outs provided by other parties. Menchu's slim share of the vote also reflects her failure to transform her public recognition and international standing into social and political leadership within Guatemala.

Menchu embodied a series of contradictions that made it hard to know how to read her as a candidate. Menchu's invaluable work in advancing genocide trials in Spain has challenged impunity and given hope that justice may be served. Yet as "Goodwill Ambassador" for the current Oscar Berger administration, she traveled the world promoting a clean human rights image for Guatemala and advocating a "break from the past." She maintained silence when CAFTA protests were met with repression.

 In many ways, the worldwide cult around the Nobel laureate ultimately harmed her relationship with the base, beginning with the perception that she used her Peace Prize money to open a profitable chain of pharmacies. Her status as a successful indigenous businesswoman made it difficult for her to fit in with either camp. W hile the mainstream business community in Guatemala marginalized her, her connections to the economic and political elite - and her choice of a coffee baron as running-mate - aroused distrust among the grassroots.

National and international actors have exploited Menchu as a symbol of multiculturalism - a categorization oft-repeated in the media - even while ignoring the very real demands of the historically exploited Maya peoples. This Western tokenization of her as an individual contributed to rifts between the image of her as representative of a movement and the on-the-ground perception that she is no longer a central leader within that movement.

Unlike Evo Morales of Bolivia, Menchu did not emerge as a candidate from the grassroots. Over time it seems that a distance has developed between her and the organized indigenous movement. For instance, she did not attend the "III Continental Summit of Indigenous Peoples and Nations of Abya Yala" in Tecpan, Guatemala in March 2007 but instead was meeting with high-level government officials in Mexico and New York.

Regardless of her showing in the polls, Menchu's candidacy certainly opened spaces for participation by women and Mayas. During election season, many indigenous women expressed the inspiration that they gained from her example.

Menchu's party Winaq ("People") chose to join with Nineth Montenegro's Encounter for Guatemala (EG). Montenegro has been a strong voice for the Left in Congress and in particular has monitored military spending. But her party is capital-city centered and does not have adequate organization in the interior.

The Left

Nineth Montenegro was one of only six leftist candidates to win seats in Congress: four with the EG and two with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). On the local municipal level, an arena where hope had been placed over the last period, only nine municipal councils will be headed by left-leaning mayors. The Guatemalan Left continues to struggle to recover from historical divisions, reinvent itself, and resonate with voters on a national level. 

In an attempt to turn things around, the URNG teamed up with the newly formed Broad-based Movement of the Left (MAIZ). A strategic effort to reunite the Left, MAIZ has engaged in significant grassroots organizing and has injected the party with a new energy. Setting its sights on the long-term, MAIZ hopes to grow in non-traditional sectors.

However, the URNG struggles from a lack of funds and a highly centralized leadership structure that has alienated some supporters. The party took surprising losses in municipal races in its traditional strongholds of Ixcan and Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa; in both areas, the oligarchy has set its sights on lucrative large-scale projects such as ports, dams, and oil drilling. In the Ixcan, overly confident of its win coming on the heels of the successful popular referendum, the URNG undertook minimal campaigning; the race was won by the Great National Alliance (GANA) which had distributed fertilizer, chickens, and tin roofing.

Also on the Left, the New National Alliance (ANN) has increasingly disillusioned its former base of supporters who deplore its sacrifice of political principles to personal ambition and its inclusion of 12 former chiefs of military intelligence in the party. Due to a paltry electoral showing, the ANN, along with three right-wing parties, disappeared as a party in these elections.

Meanwhile, many voters, particularly in the countryside, view Colom as the progressive option. Recognizing that other parties had little chance, a significant number of left-leaning voters opted for Colom. In so doing, they employed a strategy of voto practico, "practical voting" - choosing only among the candidates thought to have a decent chance of winning - rather than voto etico, "ethical voting" - voting for preferred candidates regardless of their standing in the polls. The media played into the dynamic of voto practico by focusing on the top vote-getters and publishing polls based on small sample sizes, in effect limiting citizens' perceptions of possible victors.

Rios Montt Returns to Congress

In Congressional races, Guatemalans vote for a party rather than for individuals. Designated number one on his party's national list, General Efrain Rios Montt, dictator of the country during the height of the civil war, secured a seat in Congress. Nevertheless, his party, the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), lost significant ground: its share of municipal councils dwindled from 122 to 18 of the countrywide total, and in Congress its numbers were halved.

Despite his hiatus from Congress during the last four years, Rios Montt continued to wield significant behind-the-scenes power, holding regular meetings with his party and publicly commenting on proposed legislation and public policy.

This time around, 11 parties will run Congress; those with greatest representation are the UNE with 48 seats, GANA with 37, and the PP with 30. As no one party secured a majority, representatives will have to forge alliances in order to pass legislation. Since the FRG mustered only 15 slots, its influence in making or breaking bills is expected to wane.

In returning to Congress, Rios Montt expects to enjoy immunity for the next four years. But war survivors and their lawyers are investigating ways to curtail his immunity for genocide, perhaps through an act of Congress or through administrative procedures that would ensure his extradition to Spain to stand trial. According to lawyer Benito Morales of the Menchu Foundation, Rios Montt's diplomatic immunity does not apply to crimes of the past.

Exclusion and Contradiction

On the surface, these elections appeared more inclusive than previous ones. An additional thousand voting booths were installed in small towns to increase turnout in rural areas. Legions of electoral observers - from the European Union, the Human Rights Procurator's office, the Organization of American States, the University of San Carlos, and other groups - verified the absence of large-scale fraud.

Yet exclusion and discrimination continue to plague Guatemala's fledgling democracy. Voting instructions and guidelines for election authorities were not available in Mayan languages. And the demographics of the contenders did not come close to reflecting Guatemala's racial and ethnic diversity. Although they comprise the majority of the population, indigenous candidates ran in just 14% of parties' slots. Indigenous leaders are better represented at the local level, heading up 129 (39%) of the municipal councils for the next period. Yet even those Mayas elected to public office have to confront a system of government based on non-indigenous values and structures.

Poor candidates or those without wealthy sponsors have little chance of entering the playing field at all. Radio Libertad contends, "This type of electoral process is based in electoral marketing where those who have the most resources to invest in propaganda are those who gain the best position." On the local level, subtle and not-so-subtle forms of vote-buying take place in which candidates distribute gifts, promise to bring in development projects, or pay voters outright.

Gender imbalance affected the races as well, with women representing barely 13% of candidacies. Only 21 congresspeople and eight municipal mayors for the 2008-2011 period will be women.

Exclusion is only one piece of the problem. Misleading information, partial truths, and cover-ups reigned in Guatemala's 2007 elections, including the following examples of Orwellian double-speak:

• In marked contrast to his main campaign motto trumpeting a crackdown on violence, Patriot Party (PP) candidate Otto Perez Molina is himself implicated in numerous crimes.
• The Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) propped up slogans such as "Women to Congress" and campaign ads featuring its female candidates; however, the party's dismal track record on legislation to guarantee women's rights belies its purported inclusion of women.
• Though dominated by big-business interests, in its primary slogan the Party for National Advancement (PAN) attested that it promotes "a Guatemala without owners or bosses."

Looking Ahead

Regardless of which candidate captures the Presidency, the majority of Guatemalans will not experience a significant change in their wellbeing. Nor do most voters expect to. Ricardo Falla explains, "People don't see the campaign as a fight to win a share of the power in order to change things, but rather as a fight to win a share of the business in order to get rich."

Despite their unmistakably divergent past trajectories and campaign messages, neither Colom nor Perez seems capable of challenging the rampant impunity in the country or dismantling the networks of organized crime and drug trafficking that control Guatemalan politics. Neither contender represents a departure from the mentality of free trade and mega-development, an approach that spells disaster for small-scale businesses and farmers alike. And neither plans to alienate the U.S. government, transnational corporations, or local elites by undertaking land reform or empowering local communities to manage their own natural resources.

Not all of Guatemala's political races are as deeply flawed as its presidential elections. In participatory referendum processes known as "community consultations," people around the country have taken local and regional decision-making into their own hands.

Furthermore, the elections season is neither the sole vehicle nor the primary justification for grassroots organizing, nor do election results accurately reflect the strength of Guatemala's social movement. No matter who runs the government, individuals and organizations in Guatemala will forge ahead with their work for social justice, freedom, and a democracy that goes beyond a one-day spectacle at the polls.

NISGUA is independent and not affiliated with any political party.

Sources:

Castro, Medarda, representative of the Mision Indigena de Observacion Electoral. Interview by Sue Kuyper. September 10, 2007.

Coordinadora Nacional Indigena y Campesina (CONIC). "Asistiremos a las Urnas Electorales como Parte de Nuestra Resistencia Maya y Popular." September 5, 2007.
Falla, Ricardo. "Rigoberta Menchu: ?estrella fugaz en el cielo electoral?" August 2007.
Guerra, Maria. "Rigoberta en el centro de la polemica." Este Pais. April 2007.
Lopez, Mildred. "?Una Vida Digna con Promesas Electorales?" Area de Estudios sobre Campesinado, AVANCSO. August 2007.
Nairn, Allan. "C.I.A. Death Squads." The Nation. April 1995.
Plataforma Agraria, "GANA y FRG intentan comprar voto en area Ixil." September 4, 2007. "Politics still dominated by ladino elite." Central American Report. September 12, 2007.
Radio Libertad. "Elections2007 in Guatemala: a road without a way out." Indymedia Chiapas. September 9, 2007.
Solano, Luis, independent analyst and journalist. Interview by Sue Kuyper. September 10, 2007.
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). Hidden Powers in Post-Conflict Guatemala. 2006.
Also Guatemalan daily newpapers "El Periodico" and "Prensa Libre" and news agencies Centro de Estudios de Guatemala, Prensa Latina, and Incidencia Democratica.

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